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lN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintif!-Respondent,

vs.
RUSSELL LEONARD MORAINE,

Case No.

12148

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from the appellant's conviction af
the crime of robbery, entered by a jury's verdict on April
22, 1970, in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Aldon J. Anderson,
Judge, presiding.
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE IN LOWER COURT
The appellant, Russell L. Moraine, was convicted of
robbery following a jury trial. He was sentenced on the
28th day of April, 1970, to an indeterminate term in the
Utah State Prison.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent asks this Court to affirm appellant's
conviction of robbery and hold that no errors were committed by the trial court.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondent agrees with the statement of facts as
outlined by the appellant, but wishes to emphasize that
the appellant was in fact shot in the leg as he was leaving
the scene of the robbery ( T. 86) ; and further that the
police officers in pursuing the robbers followed a trail of
blood to where the appellant was hiding (T. 79). It should
also be noted that the appellant was followed by a Harold
P. Ford, and it was according to his directions that the
police found the blood and then the appellant.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE STATEMENTS MADE BY APPELLANT
TO POLICE OFFICERS WERE COMPLETELY
' .
. VOLUNTARY AND ADMISSIBLE UNDER

.

. MIRANDA.
Miranda

v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966) applies only

to custodial interrogations.
" . . . the prosecution may not use statements,
whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from
custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it
demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards
effective to secure the privileges against self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation we mean
questioning initiated by law enforcement officers
after a person has been taken into custody or
wise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Id. at 444.
Miranda does not apply to statements which are given

voluntarily. In writing the opinion for the Court, Mr:
Chief Justice Warren emphasized:
"There is no requirement that police stop a
person who enters a police station and states that
he wishes to confess to a crime, or a person who
calls the police to offer a confession or any other
statement he desires to make. Volunteered state- ments of any kind are not barred by the Fifth
Amendment and their admissibility is not affected
by our holding today." Id. at 478. (Emphasis
added.)
In this case the appellant Moraine was given the
Miranda warning by both Officers Eugene P. Hunt and
Norman Steen (T. 90; 101). The appellant does not contest.
the warning itself as being deficient in any way. Moraine
was told twice that he had the right to remain absolutely
silent and that anything he said could and would be used .
against him at his trial. There is no question but that.
Moraine understood the warnings given him. The appellant
made no response to the warning and did not indicate
whether he wanted an attorney present. The appellant was
taken into custody and transported by police car to the hospital. On the way to the hospital, Mr. Steen, who knew the
appellant previously, talked to him. There is no testimony
as to what was said except that Mr. Steen asked the appellant "why he had done it" (T. 103). There is nothing in
the trial transcript to indicate that other questions were
asked about appellant's connection with the robbery. There
was no interrogation being conducted by Officer Steen.
After the question was asked, the appellant, who had been
fully advised of his rights, including the right against self-
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incrimination, responded voluntarily by saying that he
needed the money for Christmas (T. 103). This statement
was made after appellant was fully advised of his rights,
and he knew that he had the right to remain silent.
The setting in which the statement was made is important. Even though the appellant had been shot in the
leg, there is no testimony that he was in extreme pain.
There was no police brutality or coercion. There is no evidence that other questions were asked by Officer Steen
concerning the robbery. There was no interrogation of the
appellant. As stated in Miranda: "Any statement given
freely and voluntarily without any compelling influences
;s, of course, admissible in evidence." 484 U. S. at 478.
T.here were no compelling influences in this case and the
,appellant's statement was given freely and voluntarily.
The appellant claims in his brief that there was no
valid waiver of his right against self-incrimination. The
fact is, however, that appellant answered the question after
knowing that he did not have to answer. Just by answering
the question the appellant waived his rights, and all that
the State needed, to show that the appellant did waive his
rights, was that he answered the question. So the appellant's argument that the record is absolutely devoid of any
showing by the State of a waiver is without merit. Further,
there is no showing that the appellant did indicate after
the warnings that he wished to remain silent. He said
nothing after the warnings were given to him. This silence
was not the basis of the waiver, but the silence is important
when coupled with the fact that the appellant did in fact
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answer a question put to him by Officer Steen. Having
said nothing, the arresting officer could ask him if he
wished to waive his rights. Officer Steen, in effect, did
just that when he asked appellant "why he had done it."
The statement by appellant to Officer Steen is admissible both because it was voluntary and because it consti..
tute a waiver of his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The statement was voluntary in the traditional
sense and Miranda does not require its exclusion, but on
the contrary, sanctions its admission as evidence. The trial
court did not err in allowing the statement into evidence.
The appellant also challenges the statement made by
himself to Officer Calvin J. Crockett while in the hospital
recovering from a gunshot wound (T. 86). Officer Crockett
had been assigned to guard the appellant at this hospital;
He had also taken part in the robbery investigation,
his assignment had been completed prior to his assignment
as a guard. The appellant and Officer Crockett were dis.cussing guns one day, and the appellant told Officer Crockett that "since he had been shot in the leg coming out of
the Seven-Eleven Store attempting to bring the hammer
forward without actually firing it he had become somewliat
leery of that type of weapon" (T. 86). Again, this statement was made voluntarily and freely and is admissible
under Miranda. In People v. Spearman, 1 Cal. App. 3d 898,
82 Cal. Rptr. 277 (1969), the defendant made the statement "I have been trying real hard to go straight, I just
made a mistake last night." The officer had just given him
the Miranda warning and was not going to interrogate him.

ti

The court held that the statement was spontaneous and
voluntary and hence admissible. It was also determined
that at this point it was unnecessary to determine if the
Miranda warning was complete, understood or waived.
Also in Williams v. Johnson, 225 Ga. 654, 171 S. E. 2d
145 ( 1969), the Georgia Supreme Court ruled that admissions made by a defendant were admissible where they
were made without interrogation. Both statements were
made voluntarily and after the appellant was given his
Miranda warnings.
On the question of waiver, there is ample authority
for the proposition that by answering questions or making
after receiving the Miranda warning, the defendant does make a valid waiver by making a statement
or answering a question. In Pettyjohn v. United States,
F. 2d 651 (D. C. Cir. 1969), the accused made a conafter being warned of his right to remain silent.
He was asked if "he wanted to talk about it." Id. at 655.
The defendant then answered all the questions freely and
easily. He waived his right to remain silent by talking
when the question was asked. As in this case, the defendant in Pettyjohn was told more than once that he had
the right to remain silent and that counsel would be appointed to represent him. This fact that Pettyjohn was
so advised convinced the Court that he meaningfully and
knowingly waived his Fifth Amendment right to remain
silent. The Court premised this holding with the following:
"Thus we conclude that, under the law today,
it is possible for a person to waive his right to remain silent and to wish to voluntarily discuss the
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action that he had so recently taken which must
have weighed so heavily on his mind." Id. at 654.
The case before this Court is an excellent example of the
D. C. Circuit Court's premise. The appellant did waive his
right against self-incrimination and both statements were
made voluntarily and in the absence of any threats or coercion. See also, Pryor v. State, 449 S. W. 2d 482 (Tex.
Cr. 1970); Smith v. State, 229 So. 2d 551 (Miss. 1970);
State v. Jiminez, 22 Utah 2d 233, 451 P. 2d 583 (1969).
The Jiminez case applies particularly to the second statement made by the appellant to Officer Crockett while at the
hospital. The statement was not solicited by the police officer, and was not made in response to any questions asked
by Officer Crockett.
The respondent submits that the trial court did not
commit error in allowing both statements into evidence.
Both were made voluntarily and both constituted a waiver
of his rights of which he had been warned twice.
POINT IL
THE APPELLANT'S PRIVILEGE AGAINST
SELF - INCRIMINATION WAS N 0 T IN FRINGED BY STATEMENTS MADE BY THE
PROSECUTOR CONCERNING APPELLANT'S
SILENCE IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE
MIRANDA WARNING.
It should be pointed out at the outset that this is not
a situation where the prosecutor made reference to the jury
about appellant's refusal to testify at trial. The statement
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made by the assistant district attorney was with reference
to appellant's silence immediately after he was given his
Mfranda warnings (T. 106). Also the record does not indicate clearly, exactly what comment was made to the jury.
No proffer of proof was made by the appellant so that his
point could be preserved on appeal. The near silent record
makes it very difficult for this Court to find any prejudicial
conduct. There is nothing in the transcript which indicates
that the appellant was prejudiced. The Supreme Court
cannot consider facts stated in briefs which may be true
but which are not present in the official record. Watkins
V. Simonds, 14 Utah 2d 406, 385 P. 2d 154 (1963). Cooper
v. Forester's Underwriters, Inc., 123 Utah 214, 257 P. 2d
540 (1953).
In this case any remark made by the prosecutor regarding the appellant's waiver of his Miranda rights was
proper since the appellant had in fact waived those rights.
The waiver is discussed in Point I. Even assuming error,
it was not prejudicial error and did not effect the substantial rights of the appellant.
"After hearing on appeal the court must give
judgment without regard to errors or defects which
do not affect the substantial rights of the parties."
Utah Code Ann. § 77-42-1 (1953).
Once a fair trial has been given and the verdict is supported by the evidence, the proceedings are presumed to be
valid and the court will not reverse for mere technicalities
or irregularities. State v. Valdez, 19 Utah 2d 426, 429, 433
P. 2d 53, 55 ( 1967).

1

1

The United States Supreme Court has recognized that
some constitutional errors are harmless.
"We are urged by petitioners to hold that all
federal constitutional errors, regardless of the facts
and circumstances, must always be deemed harmful.
Such a holding, as petitioners correctly point out,
would require an automatic reversal of their convictions and make further discussion unnecessary. We
decline to adopt any such rule. All 50 states have
harmless error statutes or rules, and the United
States long ago through its Congress established for
its courts the rule that judgments shall not be reversed for 'errors or defects which do not affect the
substantial rights of the parties.' 28 U. S. C. § 2111.
None of these rules on its face distinguishes between federal constitutional errors and errors of
the state law or federal statutes and rules. All of
these rules, state or federal, serve a very useful purpose insofar as they block setting aside convictions
for small errors or defects that have little, if any
likelihood of having changed the result of the trial.
We conclude that there may be some constitutional
errors which in the setting of a particular case are
so unimportant and insignificant that they may
consistent with the Federal Constitution, be deemed
harmless, not requiring the automatic reversal of
the conviction." Chapman v. California, 386 U. S.
18, 21-22 (1967).

The error, if any, in this case was of such ,a nature. The
comment was made by the prosecutor after the appellant
had waived his right to remain silent. Since the appellant's
Fifth Amendment right had been waived, the prosecutor
Was within his rights to mention appellant's silence, which
silence occurred immediately after the Miranda warning
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was given. Such a comment would be no different than a
comment to the jury that a defendant had waived his Fifth
Amendment right by taking the witness stand.
In the absence of a controlling mandate from the High
Court, many states have applied the harmless error doctrine to confessions obtained in violation of Miranda.
Soolook v. State, 447 P. 2d 55 (Alaska 1968); Guyette v.
State, 438 P. 2d 244 (Nev. 1968). The Guyette court held
that failure to advise the accused of his right to the presence of counsel, either appointed or retained, constituted
harmless error. The court said:
"Although the High Court has not yet ruled
that the doctrine of harmless error may be applied
to a Miranda warning violation, the drift of its
opinions would suggest that the rule of harmless
error may be utilized when any of the new procedural safeguards, as expressed in [citations
omitted], are breached. We say this mainly because
the constitutional doctrine of those cases were not
given retrospective application, apparently for the
reason that a violation may occur without necessarily affecting the fundamental fairness of the trial.
Due process in the traditional sense is not necessarily denied the accused. The very integrity of the
fact finding process is not necessarily infected by
the violation. The reliability of the evidence received is not necessarily suspect. Hence, the rule of
'automatic reversal' does not control appellate dis;
position." Id. at 248.
The Nevada Court then ruled that there was limited room
for a "state court to consider the rule of harmless error
when the procedural safeguards of Miranda are not fullY
honored." Id. at 249.
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The respondent submits that the facts of this case provide such a setting. The appellant was not denied due
process of law. The appellant had made voluntary statements which were admissible. These statements constituted
a waiver of his right to remain silent. The appellant was
given his complete Miranda warnings twice.
The trial judge determined that the prosecutor did not
commit reversible error. Even assuming that this determination was error, it can be deemed harmless error since
it did not affect the appellant's substantial rights.
POINT III.
THE PROSECUTING ATTORNEY IS NOT REQUIRED TO SUPPLY THE DEFENSE WITH
THE EVIDENCE BEFOREHAND, AND THE
APPELLANT CANNOT CLAIM SURPRISE.
As stated by this Court in State v. Jameson, 103 Utah
129, 133, 134 P. 2d 173, 175 (1943), "the bill of particulars
need not plead matters of evidence." The purpose of the
bill of particulars was outlined in State v. Winters, 16 Utah
2d 139, 396 P. 2d 872 (1964), wherein this Court said:
"The purpose of the bill of particulars is to
inform the defendant of the particulars of the
offense sufficiently to enable him to prepare his
defense; the bill need not be so detailed as to state
matters of evidence." Id. at 144, 396 P. 2d at 875,
876.
The statements made by the appellant to Officer Crockett were matters in evidence and did not go to the particu-
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lars of the offense of robbery and did not need to be pleaded
in the bill of particulars.
In State v. Lack, 118 Utah 128, 221 P. 2d 852 (1950),
the defendant made a .motion to have the court impound
certain documents for examination by the defendant prior
to trial. He alleged that the court abused its discretion in
denying the motion. The court held :

"It is within the sound discretion of the trial
court whether a defendant shall be allowed or denied the privilege of examination of evidence in the
possession of the prosecution prior to trial." Id. at
134, 221 P. 2d at 855.
This question was again settled in State v. Martinez,
21 Utah 2d 187, 442 P. 2d 943 (1968), wherein the court
ruled that the refusal to require disclosure of prosecution's
evidence was not error. Id. at 198, 442 P. 2d at 944.
The surprise spoken of in King v. United States, 402
F. 2d 289 (10th Cir. 1968), cited on page 7 of appellant's
brief, is related to the particulars of the offense with which
the defendant is charged. The Tenth Circuit is saying that
the accused must be adequately informed of the charges
against him so as to avoid prejudicial surprise. Nothing is
said with reference to evidence being given by the prosecution. Furthermore, it cannot be claimed that the appellant
was gravely prejudiced by the statements made to Officer
Crockett being offered into evidence at trial. If anyone
should have known of such statement, it was the appellant
himself. The statement was made by him, and surely the
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state is under no obligation to tell defense counsel what his
client should tell him.
Of particular importance is the fact that when Officer
Crockett testified in court as to the statements made by
the appellant, the objection by defense counsel was not
based upon the fact that he was surprised by the statements made, but upon the basis that there had been no
showing of a waiver of his right to remain silent (T. 86).
The appellant did not make the proper objection at trial
and should not be entitled to make it at this time. 'This
Court has held that a party may not take exception on one
ground and then, if he is convicted, use different grounds
to obtain a reversal. State v. Valdez, 19 Utah 2d 426, 429,
432 P. 2d 53, '55 (1967).
In any event, the appellant was not entitled to the evidence that the prosecutor had in his possession via a bill
of particulars. The prosecutor was within his right not to
give such evidence in the bill of particulars. The respondent submits that there was no prejudice in this situation
and that the appellant cannot now claim surprise.
CONCLUSION
The respondent asks this Court to affirm the conviction of the appellant, Russell L. Moraine, on the basis that
he was given a fair trial and that no prejudicial errors
were committed by the trial court. The statements made
by the appellant were made voluntarily and with a full
understanding of his right to remain absolutely silent. No
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prejudice resulted from the prosecuting attorney mentioning to the jury that after the appellant was given his
Miranda warning he remain silent.
Respectfully submitted,

VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General

LAUREN N. BEASLEY

Chief Assistant Attorney General

Attorneys for Respondent
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